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Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of
Allocating Public Authority Beyond the State

JOST DELBROCK*

INTRODUCTION: THE BACKGROUND

Today it is widely accepted that the international system is undergoing
rather dramatic changes-changes that have a strong impact on the status and
role of the state as the once-sole political entity vested with the power to exercise
sovereign public authority (Hoheitsgewalt).'This unique status of the state, characteristic of the so-called classical period of the international system, began to be
modified in the era of the international organization of states that gradually
overlaid the classical international system in the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. State independence increasingly gave way to interdependence and institutionalized cooperation.2 Interestingly though, the growth in the number of
universal and regional international organizations during the first half of the
twentieth century was not seen as beginning a process of federalizing the international system. Under the influence of state sovereignty-the leading paradigm of the classical period-federalism was not a matter of international

*Professor em. Dr. Dr.h.c., LL.M., LLD.h.c.(IN), former director of the Walther-SchiickingInstitute of International Law, University of Kiel, Germany; Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. This is the revised and annotated version of the 2003 Earl
Snyder Lecture, presented at the Lauterpacht International Law Centre, Cambridge, U.K., on
January 30, 2003. The lecture format has been kept mostly unchanged.
1. For a more detailed description of the political and legal status of states in the earlier periods
of the international system, see WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Michael Byers trans., 2000); DAHM ET AL. I VOLKERRECHT Pt. 1, at 2-21 (Jost Delbruck & Rudiger
W61frum eds., 2d. ed. 1989). See also Jost Delbruick, Structural Changes in the InternationalSystem
and its Legal Order: InternationalLaw in the Era of Globalization, 1 Swiss REV. OF INT'L AND EUR. L.
3 [hereinafter Structural Changes]. On the state as the sole entity legitimized to exercise physical
force to ensure compliance with the law, see ALEXANDER B6HMER, DIE EUROPXISCHE UNION IM LiCHTE DER REICHSVERFASSUNG VON
OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE]

1871

[THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONSTITUTION

25 (1999).

2. See StructuralChanges, supra note I, at 6.
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concern, either in state practice or among international lawyers. 3 We shall have
to come back to this later.
Particularly after World War II, the picture began to change. The recognition of international organizations as derivative, limited subjects of international law was established.4 With their increasing expertise in dealing with
matters related to the "production of public goods" in practically all fields of
political, economic, social, and cultural life, a process of diversification of the entities exercising public authority began-although still on a very limited scalebut with some inkling of federalization. 5 At the regional level, however, the
founding of supranational organizations introduced a new quality in the diversification of entities exercising public authority. Around the European Communities, and in our days the European Union, an intense debate was and still is
under way regarding the nature of supranational organizations. 6 However, with
the process of globalization, the diversification of entities exercising public
authority has reached another dimension: Under the impact of globalization,

3. See Robert C. Lane, Federalism in the InternationalCommunity, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF PUBLIC

375-78 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995); see also Hartwig Biick, F6deralismusals
internationales Ordnungsprinzip [Federalism as a Principle of International Order], in 21
VERFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 1, at 3-15 (1964);
see also B6HMER supra note 1, at 32-35. Both authors observe that in the early times, the federal
state was considered the only genuine federal entity, with confederations, constituted by still fully
sovereign states, being only of a transitory nature.
4. See OPPENHEIM, L., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-22 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); 2 DAHM ET AL.,supra note 1, at 195-207.
5. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, FEDERAL CONSTITUTION-MAKING FOR A MULTINATIONAL WORLD 112
(1966) ("What lessons have the theory and practice of'classical' federalism to offer for what is perhaps the most striking aspect of international law and relations of the present era of change-the
movement (whether on a substantially regional basis or whether more generally transcending
geographical, even hemispheric limits) for political, military, economic integration and association
along some sort of supranational lines?");see Bfilck,supra note 3, at 1-38.
6. The European Union/European Community (EU/EC) neither strictly fits the criteria of a
federal state nor those of a confederation of sovereign states. It is a close association of states sui
generis which, on the one hand, shows traits of a federal state in that it can reach past the member
states and bind corporate entities and individuals directly by legislation, administrative decisions
or judicial decisions. On the other hand, the EU/EC-in terms of its functions and their broadening-depends on the authorization by the member states (i.e. by change of the founding instruments). See 2 DAHM ET AL,supra note 1, at 200-01.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
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7
understood as a process of denationalization (Entstaatlichung),
not only has the
"production of public goods" been shifted to international and supranational

non-state actors, but non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also become heavily involved in meeting various global challenges regarding the protection of human rights, the environment, and international security, i.e. in the
provision of "public goods."8 And, last but not least, transnational regulatory

7. Definitions of globalization are manifold, reflecting the complexity of this phenomenon.
However, there appears to be widespread agreement that globalization is a set of processes, some
of which are objective in nature (i.e. climate change, destruction of the ozone layer, underdevelopment, mass migration and massive human rights violations, global terrorism, and other similar
challenges that are inherently beyond the problem-solving capacity of the territorial nation state
and at the same time affect humankind as a whole, regardless of borders and territorial jurisdictions). Subjectively, globalization is a new perception of the political process that used to be statecentered but is now transforming into an understanding of politics as a multilayered process involving states, international, supranational, and non-governmental organizations as well as multinational enterprises. The ensuing pluralism of actors involved in the fulfillment of public tasks
has led to a relative decline in the role of the state. The inherently global nature of the various
challenges named above forced states to shift the "production of public goods" to the international
and supranational level which, in turn, entailed an absolute reduction of the role of the state as the
once-sole sovereign actor. This process of gradual decline in the role of states is referred to
throughout as a process of "denationalization" or in German "Ent-Staatlichung" ("destatization"). For a comprehensive analysis of globalization and its impacts on state and society,
see GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND CULTURE chs. 1, 3-5 (David Held, et al.
eds., 1999);see also Structural Changes, supra note 1,at 13-17. On the present dilemma facing the
international community, with regard to establishing adequate instruments of global governance,
see James N. Rosenau, Governance in a New Global Order,in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION-POWER,
AUTHORITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 70-86 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002).
8. See 2 DAHM ET AL., supra note I, at 231-43 (explaining the history, present role, and legal
status under international law of NGOs with further references); MICHAEL HEMPEL, DIE V6LKERRECHTSSUBJEKTIVITXT
TIONAL

LEGAL

INTERNATIONALER

PERSONALITY

NICHTSTAATLICHEER

OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANISATIONEN

NON-GOVERNMENTAL

[THE

INTERNA-

ORGANIZATIONS],

(1999). Other authors also recognize NGOs as limited subjects of international law. See, e.g.,
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN

passim
IGNAZ

& GERHARD LoIBL, DAs RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN

[THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS] 84 (7th ed. 2000); Stephan Hobe, Global Challenges
to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations,5 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 191, 191-209 (1997); NoN-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

passim (Rainer Hofmann ed., 1999); Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The
Status on Non-GovernmentalOrganizations Under InternationalLaw, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
579, 579-645 (1999).
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regimes must be mentioned for their role in coping with the many global chal9
lenges we face in our time.
The present paper will therefore concentrate on the question whether the
growing diversity of actors involved in the "production of public goods," and the
ensuing pluralism of institutions and actors on different levels beyond the state,
can be structured and to some extent constitutionalized in a legal framework of a
transnational federalism. Part I will address the diversification of actors exercising
public authority or participating in its exercise. Part II will first analyze the concept of federalism, specifically whether it can be transferred to the transnational
realm, and if so, whether and how the concept needs to be reconceptualized. This
Part will then describe and critically review some model approaches, and will attempt to outline a concept of transnational federalism that is not state-centered
and is thus more adequate to cope with the emerging pluralism of centers exercising public authority than traditional concepts of federalism.
I.

THE DIVERSIFICATION OF ACTORS EXERCISING PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR

PARTICIPATING IN ITS EXERCISE AND THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY

As a first step, our analysis has to establish whether and to what extent the
various actors mentioned exercise public authority or participate in its exercise.
This analysis also requires a short explanation of what is meant by the notion of
public authority. Let us begin with the latter.
According to traditional doctrine, public authority (Hoheitsgewalt) is solely
vested in states. Public authority in this sense constitutes the power of the state to
legally and legitimately impose its will upon the people residing within its territory, in the last resort by physical force. Public authority was seen as original, supreme (sovereign), singular, and indivisible."0 But state practice has never fully
conformed to this doctrine. In some federal states public authority and sovereignty

9. See Anthony McGrew, Liberal Internationalism:Between Realism and Cosmopolitanism, in
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 7, at 267-89 (giving a concise overview of the development

of regime theory); see also Rosenau supra note 7, at 71-73 (describing briefly the role of regimes or
rule-based systems).
10. See GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE [GENERAL THEORY OF THE STATE], 427-504
(3d ed. 1960) (giving a detailed analysis of the Staatsgewalt (public authority)); see also Hans
Schneider, Gewalt, 6ffentliche [authority,public], in I EVANCELISCHES STAATSLEXIKON [EVANGELICAL
STATE DICTIONARY] cols. 1123-25 (Roman Herzog et al. eds., 3d ed. 1987); Bi6HMERSUpra note 1, at
25, 192 (and sources cited therein).

TRANSNATIONAL FEDERALISM

were (and still are) shared by the federal government and the constituent member states." More importantly in the present context, after World War II states
willingly transferred parts of their authority to international organizations. The
prime example of a large scale transfer of public authority to non-state entities is
the formation of the European Communities, culminating in the present EU/
EC. Public authority proved to be divisible. 2 Furthermore, the traditional doctrine argued against the possibility of establishing public authority beyond the
state, reasoning that public authority proper must be able to enforce its actswhether legislative, administrative, or judicial-by physical force if necessary.
This argument is no longer fully valid. There is a clear trend in domestic administrative law away from hierarchical enforcement toward cooperative means of
securing compliance with the law.' 3 Cooperative means of implementation are
to complement the modes of traditional law enforcement, while not completely
replacing the latter. It is also true that in domestic legal orders even constitutional norms are not always provided with sanctions. 4 Public authority-a
11. Cf. IVAN BERNIER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 17-33 (1973); B6HMER,
supra note 1, at 180-94 (placing special emphasis on the phenomenon of a "divided" public authority not only in some federal states, but currently within the EU/EC).

12. See

ANNE PETERS, ELEMENTE

THEORY OF EUROPE'S CONSTITUTION]

EINER THEORIE DER VERFASSUNG

EUROPAS [ELEMENTS OF A

144-48 (2001); Stefan Oeter, Souveranitiit und Demokratie als

Probleme in der "Verfassungsentwicklung" der Europdischen Union [Sovereignty and Democracy as
Problems of the "ConstitutionalDevelopment" of the European Union], 55 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches 6ffentliches Recht und V51kerrecht 659, 685 (1995); KATHARINA HECKEL, DER F6DERALISMUS ALS PRINZIP ijBERSTAATLICHER

GEMEINSCHAFTSBILDUNG

SUPRANATIONAL COMMUNITY-BUILDING]

[FEDERALISM AS A PRINCIPLE OF

85-87 (1998) (arguing in favor of a "divided sover-

eignty"); BbHMER, supa note 1, at 188-94 (basing analysis on a modified concept of sovereignty that
holds on to its indivisible nature, but accepts the notion that public authority can be divided between different entities - in the case of the EU/EC, between the latter and the member states).
13. See Jost Delbrijck, Prospectsfora"World (Internal)Law?": Legal Developments in a Changing
International System, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 425-27 (2002); see also CHRISTIAN
TOMUSCHAT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: ENSURING THE SURVIVAL OF MANKIND ON THE EVE OF A NEW

358-89 (2001) (giving an account of the different means of ensuring compliance). See
& ANTONIA H. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY - COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) (describing non-confrontational compliance
strategies on the international level).
14. Thus, Konrad Hesse - former Member of the German Federal Constitutional Court and
Constitutional Law Professor Emeritus - observes: "Die Macht des Gerichts beruht nur auf
seinem Ansehen und auf der Jberzeugungskraft seiner Argumente" [[t]he power of the Court
solely rests upon its reputation and the strength of its arguments]. KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZijGE DES
CENTURY

generally

ABRAM CHAYES

VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [THE MAIN FEATURES OF GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW],

para. 567 (20th rev. ed. 1995).
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concept going back to the Latin word auctoritas(the ability to induce compliance
without enforcement)-must not necessarily be defined as narrowly as traditional doctrine pretended. Public authority will therefore be used here in a
broader meaning: it is the competence of states and other entities to perform
public tasks (to produce public goods) and to achieve compliance by cooperative
means or by sanctions including physical enforcement as a last resort.
Starting from this premise, we may now inquire into the allocation of public
authority to entities beyond the state. In order to make this analysis as lucid but
also as short as possible I shall divide it into three sections: 1) dealing with international governmental organizations, 2) dealing with supranational organizations, and 3) dealing with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and, just in
passing, with international regimes.
A. The Allocation of PublicAuthority to InternationalGovernmental Organizations
Today, the vast majority of states is embedded in a dense network of international organizations whose number has risen to about 300 over the years. 5
Most of these organizations are conceived in a traditional state-centered fashion
as purely intergovernmental fora of cooperation. They also tend to have rather
limited agendas. 6 However, those organizations concerned with centrally important subject matters like international security, the economy, environmental
protection, and telecommunications stick out from the rest not only because of
their particularly important public tasks, but also because of their rather autonomous regulatory, administrative, and judicial areas of authority. Only especially instructive examples will be mentioned here.
The United Nations Security Council, charged with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, possesses the
power to issue binding decisions. 7 The character and scope of these decisions is

15. See YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Union of International Associations ed.,
1992) (providing an overview).
16. The Universal Postal Union (UPU), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), or
the World Tourism Organization may be mentioned as examples of such organizations with
limited agendas and also as indicators of the wide range of subjects dealt with by international
organizations.
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 25; see also Delbrtick, Art. 24 and Art. 25, in THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONs-COMMENTARY

442--64 (B. Simma ed., 2nd ed. 2002) (describing details of the

meaning and scope of these two Charter provisions).
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not expressly defined. For instance, in its early and rare practice, the Council directed binding decisions to individual states under Chapter VII, to stop acts of
aggression or refrain from the threat of use of force.' In more recent times the
Council has interpreted its powers under Chapter VII more broadly to include
decisions of a "legislative" character. 9 This is clearly the case with regard to Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001. It contains, at least in part, legislative provisions taken from the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism adopted by the General Assembly 2° but not yet in force at the time.
One could argue that the determination of the Kuwait-Iraq border with erga
21
omnes effect by Security Council Resolution 687 was also a legislative act.

18. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-51. Because of the Cold War, the Security Council could rarely
achieve the necessary unanimity among the five permanent members to take enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter: in the Korean Conflict, the Security Council recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of
Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area"-an action by the Security Council that could be interpreted to constitute the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. See MICHAEL SCHAEFER, DIE
FUNKTIONSFXHIGKEIT

DES SICHERHEITSMECHANISMUS DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN [THE FUNCTION-

U.N. SECURITY MECHANISM] 129 (1981). More likely it was a recommendation to the
Members to exercise "collective self-defence" against the North Korean attack on the Republic of
Korea. See Jochen A. Frowein & N. Krisch, Art. 39, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A
COMMENTARY, SUpra note 17, at para. 30. Clearly Chapter VII-based enforcement action was taken
by the Security Council against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and against Iraq after its aggression against Kuwait in 1990, authorizing "member States co-operating with the government
of Kuwait,... to use all necessary means to ... restore international peace and security in the
area." U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). Beyond these cases,
the Security Council strongly condemned particular states for the illegal use of force: for instance,
the Israeli air raid on PLO targets in Tunisia, see U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg. at 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/573 (1985), and the call upon South Africa to cease "all acts of aggression against the
People's Republic of Angola," U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2631st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 577
(1985).
19. See Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating,96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2002) (discussing "legislative" activities of the Security Council); BARDO FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL
INC OF THE

REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO-A

CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 211-13 (1998);

Surya P.

Subedi, The Doctrine of Objective Regimes in InternationalLaw and the Competence of the United
Nationsto Impose Territorialor Peace Settlements on States, 37 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT'L L. 162 (1994);
see also Andreas L. Paulus, Art.29, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY,
supra note 17, at para. 13 (stating a more restrictive, slightly critical view on the "legislative" activities of the Security Council).
20. See G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109
(1999).
21. See Subedi, supra note 19, at 179.
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Beyond these binding legislative decisions emanating from the United
Nations, it must be remembered that the organization is involved in the elaboration and adoption of comprehensive treaties for signature and ratification by
states, and more importantly for present purposes, the creation of "hard" and
"soft" law. The United Nations makes hard law in the field of U.N. administrative law, and soft law in various areas of global concern (human rights, the environment, disarmament, etc.) by resolutions passed as solemn declarations or
charters adopted unanimously or by consensus. One may view such soft lawmaking acts as irrelevant in terms of "real" law making. But I would answer that
members of the United Nations are under a good faith obligation to seriously
consider whether to comply with such resolutions, particularly if they have consented to them.22 Furthermore, such solemn declarations or charters are an expression of an almost universal opiniojurisand thus can promote the emergence
of new international customary law.
In a similar vein, a great deal of international lawmaking occurs within
other international organizations such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In the cases of the WHO and
ICAO, binding norms can be issued, albeit with the proviso that members disagreeing can use "opting out" clauses.23 But whether strictly binding or not, one
may say that international law making, particularly by the organizations of the
U.N. family that were established to serve as fora of cooperation among member
states, has had a major impact on law making at the domestic level as well. An
important example of this impact is seen in the strict conditions set by the International Monetary Fund for recipients of funds. Another good example is the

22. Art. 2(2) obliges the Member States to fulfill their obligations assumed under the Charter in
good faith. This does not mean, of course, that the Member States must comply with recommendations (e.g. those issued by the General Assembly). However, it does mean that they are under an
(non-sanctionable) obligation to seriously consider how they should react to the recommendation
in question. See 2 DAHM ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-27; 1 Paul C. Szasz, General Law-Making
Process, inUNITED NATIONs LEGAL ORDER 35, 63-64 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner
eds., 1995).
23. See Christian Tietje, The Changing Legal Structure of InternationalTreatiesas an Aspect ofan
Emerging Global GovernanceArchitecture, 42 GERMAN Y.B. I T'L L. 26, 51-52 (1999) (highlighting
numerous examples of the doctrinal and legal policy aspects of opt-out clauses and procedures)
[hereinafter Global Governance Architecture];see also I DAHM ET AL.,supra note 1, at 665.
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Republic of Korea in the wake of the "Asian crash;" it had to revamp large parts
of its domestic legal order.24 To a considerable extent, Member States have complied with the "not strictly binding" norms proposed by these organizations by
shaping their domestic laws accordingly.25 Recalling that the concept of public
authority is not restricted to the exercise of enforcement powers, one can safely
observe that, in the legislative area at least, some public authority has been allotted to international organizations. The same is true with regard to regional international organizations such as the Council of Europe. 6
Mention must also be made of administrative or executive functions given to
international organizations. The WHO is once again an interesting example of
the exercise of administrative functions on the international level. The organization can establish certain technical and scientific standards for the protection of
health. The interesting aspect of this standard-setting is that it is achieved by intensive cooperation between international and national administrators.27 This
amounts to a vertical integration of the international and the national administrations that would normally be expected only within the structure of supranational
organizations. For the sake of brevity, I will confine myself to this one example of
the executive functions exercised by international organizations, but a good case
can be made in this regard for the FAO and others as well.28

24. See Yung Chul Park, Investment Boom, FinancialBust: The Crisis in Korea, BROOKINGS REV.,
Summer 1998, at 14; Craig P. Ehrlich & Jay K. Lee, Governance of Korea's Chaebols: Role in Crisis,
Coming Changes: How the Chaebols Got to this Point, Reform Measures (pt. 1), FOREIGN INVESTMENT,
Mar. 15, 1998 at 9; Bank Privatization in Korea: Developments and Strategies, IMF COUNTRY REP.
No. 02/20 (International Monetary Fund) (Feb. 2002); T. Lane et. al., IMF-SupportedPrograms in
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand: A PreliminaryAssessment, IMF OCCASIONAL PAPER 178 (Jan. 1999);
see also Eunsook Jung, The Role of the International Monetary Funds in the Globalization of
Economy: The Lesson from the East Asian Financial Crisis (December 2002) (unpublished research paper) (on file with author).
25. See Szasz, supra note 22, at 96-97.
26. See Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, art. 1(b), 87 U.N.T.S. 103 (noting that it is
one of the main functions of the Council of Europe to promote the harmonization of the domestic
law of its Member States through elaborating treaties that the Member States then ratify and incorporate into their domestic legal orders, mostly at the level of statutory law).
27. See CHRISTIAN TIETJE, INTERNATIONALISIERTES VERWALTUNGSHANDELN [INTERNATIONALIZED
ADMINISTRATION] 288-487 (2001) (providing a detailed analysis of the vertical integration of international and national administrators).
28. See id. at n.27.
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With regard to the exercise of judicial functions by international organizations, one may point to the well-established U.N. Administrative Tribunal,29 to
the doctrinally controversial establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda by the Security Council-today
generally seen to be effected under Chapter VII together with article 29 of the
U.N. Charter°-and the establishment of the International Criminal Court
under the Rome Statute of 1998. 3" Individuals have access or are subject to the
jurisdiction of these international tribunals and courts. Reference should also be
made to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, which provides for judicial
panels of first and appellate instance. Their final decisions are strictly binding on
the state parties and have, of course, major implications for the commercial
transactions of private enterprises as well.32
This necessarily sketchy survey of international organizations involved in
the exercise of public authority would be incomplete if one failed to mention the

29. Against the considerable resistance of some states, notably the Soviet Union and the United
States, the U.N. Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) was finally established by the U.N. General
Assembly based on a Statute for the Tribunal. See G.A. Res. 351 (IV), U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess.,
(1949); see also Statement of the U.N. Secretary General, in I.C.J. Pleadings 1954, U.N. Admin. Tribunal 226 (detailing the history of the establishment of UNAT). See generally HANS-JOACHIM
PRIESS, INTERNATIONALE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTE

UND BESCHWERDEAUSSCHUSSE

[INTERNATIONAL AD-

(1989) (providing a detailed study of international administrative courts and complaint commissions).
30. See Delbriuck, supra note 17, at para. 20; see Paulus,supra note 19 at para. 56. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by Security Council
Resolution SC Res. 827 of May 25, 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was
established by Security Council Resolution SC Res. 955 of November 8, 1994. See LORI F.
DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 411-14, 1332-66 (4th ed. 2001) (setting forth the history of
the establishment and the functions and powers of the two tribunals); Paulus, supra note 19, at
paras. 61-75, 76-81,passim. On the question of the legality of establishing criminal tribunals by
resolution of the Security Council, see Prosecutorv. Tadic, International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber Case No. IT-94-AR72 - Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, October 2, 1995, reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996).
31. The international efforts to establish a permanent international criminal court, reaching
back at least to the early years of post World War 1I, finally succeeded in 1998 when the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on July 17,
1998 (U.N. Doc. A/CONE 183/9). The Statute, reaching the necessary quorum of ratifications, entered into force on July 1, 2002; presently, there are 139 signatories and 90 parties to the Statute.
32. For a concise summary of the functions and powers of the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, see Peter Tobias Stoll, World Trade, Dispute Settlement, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 3, at 1520-29.
MINISTRATIVE

COURTS AND COMPLAINT COMMISSIONS]
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large number of regional international organizations, particularly in the economic field. Much of what has been observed here with regard to international
(universal) organizations applies to these regional institutions as well. As David
Held, Anthony McGrew, and their co-authors have aptly stated: "the emergence
33
of a new regionalism has introduced a new layer of governance."
In summary, even from the few examples mentioned thus far one may conclude that public authority has been allotted to international organizations to a
degree that may not have been expected, given the purely intergovernmental approach to the founding of international organizations in the early years of the
twentieth century and even later, when international organizations were perceived as supplementary instruments for the implementation of domestic public
tasks.
B. The Allocation of PublicAuthority to SupranationalOrganizations
To prove that public authority has been transferred to supranational
organizations-the prime example being the European Community or European
Union-is much easier. The European Community Treaty (ECT) clearly establishes that the EC/EU has the authority to legislate, to execute administrative
functions, and to adjudicate legal disputes through the European Court of Justice
(ECJ).34 With regulations and decisions, the EC/EU can directly reach past the
member governments to the citizens of the member states, whether natural persons or juridical corporate entities. 35 Although the EC/EU's powers were once
conceived of as limited or enumerated, today these powers cover a wide range of
economic, social, political, and more recently, cultural areas. Part of the reason for

33. Held et. al., supra note 7, at 74.
34. European Community Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, availableat http://www.hri.org/docs/ Rome57/
Protocols.htm. In order to fulfill their functions according to article 249 of the ECT, the European
Parliament, the Council, and the Commission-in varying combinations-have the authority to
legislate (i.e. to issue regulations and directives); the Commission, for example, exercises typically
executive functions with regard to the enforcement of the ECT competition law (investigations,
hearings, imposition of fines). Id. at arts. 85, 249. In articles 220-45, the ECT provides for an elaborate judicial system. Id. at arts. 220-45.
35. According to art. 249, regulations possessing general applicability are binding in their entirety, and are directly applicable in all Member States. European Community Treaty, supra note
34, at art. 249. Regulations confer rights and duties directly upon EC citizens, whether natural
persons or corporate entities, and are ultimately enforceable by the ECJ. See MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 901 (4th ed. 1997).
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the dynamic broadening of the EU/EC powers is that few transactions in modern
societies do not have an economic, or more precisely a market, dimension. Thus,
for instance, the European Court of Justice-like a constitutional court-early on
ruled in a dynamic interpretation of the ECT that the lack of any explicit authority in cultural affairs did not mean that the EU/EC could not issue directives with
regard to transborder television broadcasts. The Court recognized that at least in
some member states, broadcasting was considered a cultural activity. But since
broadcasting was also an economic transaction-a service in the sense of the
ECT-the EU/EC had authority to legislate in this field.36
Given these broad legislative, executive and judicial functions of the EU/
EC, including regulations suspending and directives guiding the corresponding
domestic legislative authority of each member state, the EU/EC shows a number
of characteristics of a state rather than an international, intergovernmental organization. However, it is well accepted that the EU/EC is not yet a state, but is also
more than a mere confederation of sovereign states.37 We shall come back to this
shortly. In any event, it cannot be denied that the EU/EC has been allotted a
wealth of public authority.

36. See Case 155/73, Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409 and Case 52/79, Du Roi v. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R.
833, 855. The question of the authority of the EC to legislate in the fields of transborder broadcasting and television led to an intense debate, particularly in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, because of their delicately balanced broadcasting and television systems. In Germany,
broadcasting and television were considered to be a cultural activity falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Lander (federal states); in the Netherlands, the established system took great care
to attribute a fair share of access to the broadcasting facilities and programs for the large number
of religious and political groups. See Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders, 1988 E.C.R. 2085.
37. The exact status of the EC/EU in conceptual terms is the subject of much doctrinal debate,
particularly in Continental Europe. In Anglo-American literature, the question of the "true" legal
nature of the EC/EU is usually answered by reference to the pronouncement of the ECJ in Van
Gend en loos v.Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 ECR 1, 1963 CMLR 105, that the
EC/EU "constitutes a new legal order of international law." See, e.g., I OPPENHEIM, supra note 4,
at 20, n.2; SHAW, supra note 35, at 901-02. In Continental European, and especially German, literature, much intellectual effort has been spent on how to conceptually capture the new phenomenon of the EC/EU, but with little success. Surely terms like "Staatenverbund"(association of states)
or state community sui generis indicate that the EC/EU neither fits the traditional concepts of
"confederation" or "federal state," but that does not mean much more than the matter-of-fact observation that the EC/EU constitutes a "new legal order of international law." Probably the most
telling description of the EC/EU is that of Thomas Oppermann, who speaks of the EC/EU as a
"Kategorie intensiver, staatsnaherVerbindung zwischen ihren Mitgliedstaaten" [a category of intensive, state-like association between its members]. THOMAS OPPERMANN, EUROPARECHT 74 (2nd.
ed. 1999).
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C. The Allocation of Public Authority to Nongovernmental Organizations
On first sight, it may appear to be quite an outlandish notion to speak of the
allocation of public authority to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). But a
closer look reveals that domestic legal orders have long delegated public authority to private entities from time to time and, indeed, we have recently witnessed
the same phenomenon on the international level. Historically in domestic law,
the vesting of public authority in private entities has been more or less a matter
of convenience (for instance, conferring some traffic regulation functions to
road construction companies).38 Today, under the impact of globalization, the
enlistment of private enterprises to implement public tasks has become a necessary strategy to make states leaner and more competitive. For the same reason,
states have to some extent shifted the exercise of public authority to international
and supranational organizations, and NGOs as well.
Today, NGOs have not only tremendously increased in numbers, but the
larger NGOs in growing global networks have also played an important political role in international relations.3 9 This important role is now reflected in international law, categorical rejections of this observation by some authors notwithstanding.4" Within the United Nations system, NGOs are accorded a limited legal status under the secondary rules of the Charter system. Based on article
71 of the U.N. Charter, the Economic and Social Council has provided for procedures by which certain NGOs possess the status of observers, and have the
right not only to attend open meetings of the Council and of its suborgans, but
also to make written and oral contributions to the deliberations of the respective
organs." Similar status is provided for NGOs by other U.N. family organizations and by the Council of Europe.42 In this respect one may speak of NGOs as
38. In German administrative law, conferring public authority to private entities is a wellknown pratice. It is called "Beleihung" [delegation].
39. See DAHM ET AL., supra note 1, at 231-43 (referring to the rich literature on the role and
status of NGOs).
40. See id.; Structural Changes,supra note 1,at 23-26; Hobe, supra note 8; Nowrot, supra note 8.
41. See DAHM ET AL, supra note 1, at 231-43; Structural Changes, supra note 1,at 23-26; Hobe,
supra note 8; Nowrot, supra note 8.
42. See, e.g., ILO CONST., art. 12 § 3 (permitting the Organization to consult NGOs, including
international employers' associations and trade unions and related associations). The Statute of
the Council of Europe does not contain an explicit reference to NGOs, but under its organizational powers the Council provided for a consultative status for NGOs by a series of resolutions
passed by the Committee of Ministers. For a detailed study of the relationship between Special-
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limited derivative legal subjects under secondary rules of international law.43
The status accorded to NGOs allows them to participate in the exercise of public
authority. The respective functions mainly relate to international law making.
In exercising these functions, NGOs not only advise the organs of international
organizations, but in some instances they have made major contributions to the
process of drafting new conventions.44 Major universal conferences have followed the example of the U.N. organs and made use of the expertise of NGOs,
which act as (in a sense self-appointed) advocates of the public interest of the in45
ternational community.
In the field of the international protection of human rights, the status of
NGOs has been developed even further. NGOs have rights directly under conventional human rights law, i.e. the primary rules of international law. Thus,
they possess standing before international human rights courts and before
human rights monitoring bodies, i.e. the Protocol Additional to the U.N. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,46 and the European and American Human
Rights Conventions.47 Thereby, they enjoy a derivative limited international
legal personality and they partake in the enforcement of human rights. 4 In
order to fulfill this enforcement function they also perform an important general monitoring function. International tribunals, such as the Tribunal on
ized International Organizations and the Council of Europe on the one hand, and NGOs on the
other hand, see HEMPEL, supra note 8, at 170-89; see also CHRIS N. OSEKE, CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS
OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW-AN EXAMINATION OF THE ENTITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THEIR TREATY MAKING CAPACITY
ORGANISATION

H.

-A

69 (1974);

VICTOR-YVEs GHEBALI, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR

CASE STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION OF

U.N. SPECIALIZED AGENCIES 31 (1989);

PETER

ROHN, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND INTERNATIONAL NoN-GOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS passim (1957).

43. This view began decades ago. See Hermann Mosler, Die Erweiterungdes Kreises der V6lkerrechtssubjekte [The enlargement of the number of subjects of internationallaw], 22 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLXNDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT

1,45 (1962); 1 DAHM

ET AL.,

supra note 1,

at 240.
44. See Nowrot, supra note 8, at 593-94; Jonathan I. Charney, Universal InternationalLaw, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 543-50 (1993).
45. See Nowrot, supra note 8, at 593-94 (and sources cited therein)(describing conferences held
in Rio, Cairo, Beijing, and Vienna).
46. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
47. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
amended by Protocols Nos 3,5, 8, and 11, Nov. 4,1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1959, Org. of Am. States T.S., OEA/Ser.K/XVI/I.1 Doc. 65, Rev. 1.
48. See I DAHM ET AL., supra note 1, at 241; Hobe, supra note 8; Nowrot, supra note 8.
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former Yugoslavia (Rule 74 of the Tribunal's rules of procedure) increasingly
make use of the expertise relevant NGOs acquire in the course of their monitoring activities by inviting them to be amici curiae. Similar monitoring and imple-

mentation functions are accorded to NGOs in international environmental
protection conventions. Examples include the so-called Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat;49 the
Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora;50 and the Convention to Combat Desertification in those
5
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification. 1
As a last aspect of their involvement in the exercise of public authority, NGOs'
role in the evolution of so-called framework conventions, which have become a
frequent regulatory instrument in international environmental law, is worthy of
mention.52 These multilateral conventions determine only basic principles of intended state conduct. The concrete obligations of the parties and the detailed regulations are left to the later adoption of amending protocols or, in the case of highly
technical regulations, are delegated to expert committees or technical institutions,
which in some cases are NGOs 3 The reason for this procedure is that framework
conventions of this kind require a high degree of expertise for the elaboration of
the detailed regulations, and more often than not need to be frequently amended
because of the rapidly changing scientific findings. Given the fact that the amending protocols in many cases enter into force through a simplified procedure, the
regulatory input by the NGO experts is dominant. In short, NGOs supplement

49. Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Dec. 21, 1975, 1976
U.K.T.S. 34, at cmnd. 6465, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 969 (1972).
50. International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27
U.S.T. 1087, 1976 U.K.T.S. 101, at cmnd. 6647, reprintedin 12 I.L.M. 1088 (1973).
51. Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought
and/or Desertification, Dec. 26, 1996, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1328 (1994).
52. See ANTHONY AuST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 97 (2000) (giving a short but very
pertinent definition of framework conventions); TIETJE supra note 27, at 247-50; Global Governance Architecture, supra note 23, at 50-51 (regarding the role of framework conventions in international law in general and in international environmental law, in particular); see also PATRICIA W.
BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13,27 (1992).
53. See, for instance, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), whichtogether with the Comit6 Europ~en de Normalisation (CEN) and the Deutsche Institut fur
Normung e.V. (DIN)--established the DIN EN ISO 14001 Standard for Environmental
Mangagement. See TIETJE, supra note 27, at 410-11.
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and sometimes even substitute for the implementation of public tasks incumbent
54
on state parties to the respective conventions.
In passing, let me mention that in recent decades international regimesdefined as more or less institutionalized clusters of principles, norms and
rules 55-have received growing attention with regard to their conflict-resolving
capacity. This includes the capacity to ensure compliance, particularly in cases of
conflicting interests in the distribution and preservation of natural resources or
other common goods. 56 This capacity appears to indicate that international regimes are also involved in exercising public functions and thereby constitute yet
another seat of public authority beyond the state. But this issue needs closer analysis than time permits here.
In summary, the findings laid out justify the conclusion that we are facing a
rather complex system of global, international, and national governance. From
a vertical perspective, we see a multilayered structure of governance, the different layers being more or less closely interconnected and penetrating each other.
Horizontally, we see a multiplicity of actors involved in the exercise of public authority in varying degrees of intensity. The horizontal multiplicity of actors and
their vertical interconnectedness has made classical concepts of the structure of
the international system obsolete; international relations as the exclusive domain
of states and the clean separation of the domestic and the international realms
are no longer valid concepts. 57 Furthermore, the partial shifting of the exercise of
public authority away from states raises serious questions with regard to the legitimacy of the exercise of public authority by nonstate actors, and with regard
to a clear localization of the responsibility and accountability of individual actors
in the changed international system. In attempts to come to grips with these

54. See Global Governance Architecture, supra note 23, at 44-53 (giving examples in international, economic, and environmental law).
55. On the concept of international regimes and the development of regime theory, see INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983);

ROBERTO. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER

(3d. ed. 2001); REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (V.
Rittberger ed., 1990); see also ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, POWER AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY
GLOBALIZED WORLD 1-18 (2002). On rule-based systems exercising authority, see Rosenau, supra
note 7, at 71-73.
56. See KLAUS D. WOLF, INTERNATIONALE REGIME ZUR VERTEILUNG GLOBALER RESSOURCEN
[INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL RESOURCES] (1991).
57. See David Held, Regulating Globalization, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 420, at
422-23 (Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2000) (giving a similar interpretation of changes in
the exercise of public authority caused by globalization).
AND
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challenges, the question has been raised as to whether a federalism-based interpretation of the present structure of the international system could help us to
understand this structure more clearly, and also normatively to introduce the
needed coherence and transparency into the perceived "jungle."

II.

TRANSNATIONAL FEDERALISM-AN ADEQUATE CONCEPT FOR THE
STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM?

A. Federalism:A Concept Applicable to the TransnationalRealm?
Answering this question requires a short examination of the methodological problem of applying the traditionally state-centered concepts of federalism to
the transnational realm. The debate over the meaning of the concept, or rather
concepts, of federalism has a long history that cannot be traced here.58 Suffice it
to say that federalism as a constitutional framework for individual states and as
a form of international institutionalized cooperation of states, could not exist
prior to the emergence of the modern sovereign territorial state. Because of the
strong influence of the principle of sovereignty on political theory, particularly
in continental Europe, federated states (i.e. states formed by sovereign states
under the roof of a federal government) were the subject of sharp doctrinal controversy.59 Some authors argued that the very idea of sovereign states subjecting
themselves to the central rule of a federal government was self-contradictorya debate that, for instance, accompanied the founding of the German Reich of
1871.60 Such an arrangement could only be understood as a transitory stage to

58. See generally, e.g., Carl J. Friedrich, FederalConstitutionalTheory and Emergent Proposals,in
MATURE AND EMERGENT (Arthur W. Macmahon ed., 1955); Carl J. Friedrich,
Ursprung und Entwicklung des Begriffes des F6deralismusin den Vereinigten Staaten [Origin and Development ofthe Concept of Federalism in the United States], in 4 F6DERALISMUS UND VERFASSUNGSFEDERALISM:

RECHT,

STUDIEN

ZUR

POLITIK

[FEDERALISM

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

(Edward McWhinney ed., 1962); Louis LE FUR,
[FEDERAL STATE AND CONFEDERATION OF STATES]

LAW,

STUDIES

IN

tTAT FEDERAL ET CONF9DERATION

(1896);

GEORG MEYER,

LEHRBUCH

POLITICS]

D'1TATS

DES STAATS-

RECHTS [TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (Gerhard Anschutz ed., 6th rev. ed. 1905);
supra note 11, at 1-17; B1SHMER, sUpra note 1, at 25-32, 98-112; Lane, supra note 3.

BERNIER,

59. See B6HMER, supra note 1, at 25-32, 98-112 (summarizing the main positions in this debate).

60. Id. at 98-112. See generally Michael

DREYER, F6DERALISMUS ALS ORDNUNGSPOLITISCHES UND

NORMATIVES PRINZIP-DAS F6DERATIVE DENKEN DER DEUTSCHEN IM

19 JAHRHUNDERT [FEDERALISM AS

POLITICAL AND NORMATIVE PRINCIPLE-THE GERMAN CONCEPTUALIZATION OF FEDERALISM IN THE

19TH CENTURY] (1987) (giving a detailed analysis ofGerman federalist theory in the 19th century).
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the final creation of a unitary state. The only acceptable form of a federal state
entity compatible with the principle of sovereignty was the confederation of sov61
ereign stateS.
On the other hand, other voices argued that sovereignty was not an essential
element of statehood and therefore the concept of a federal state with a federal
government, possessing the supreme authority to dispose of the right to allocate
or assume authority, was a valid form of constitutional order within a state, as
distinguished from the mere confederation on the one hand and the unitary state
on the other hand. 62 All the authors involved in this debate agreed on one aspect:
They all based their preferences on a state-centered view of federalism, which if
still accepted would preclude us from applying the concept of federalism to the
international level. However, with the emergence of institutionalized cooperation in international relations, i.e. the founding of international organizations,
and more importantly, with the advent of supranational organizations after
World War II, the concept of federalism was increasingly stripped of its statecenteredness. The debate over the status of states and their sovereignty as members of these new organizations is still rampant, 63 but it no longer dominates the
scene. Rather, the focus of interest has shifted to the interpretation of federalism
as an international and national formative principle, as a functional-organizational and structural principle. 64 Today, there appears to be no principal methodological or doctrinal objection to applying the concept of federalism to the levels
beyond the state. In fact, there are increasing attempts to use the concept of federalism in developing models of transnational governance by which the exercise
of public authority beyond the state could be made more transparent, more ruleof-law based, and even more democratically legitimate. In the next section, I
summarize and critically review some of these models before undertaking the
adventure of clarifying the concept of transnational federalism.

61. See Biilck,supra note 3; B6HMERSUpra note 1.
62. See Biilck,supra note 3, at 12-14;see B6HMER supra note 1, at 30-32.

63. See Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 4

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 3, at 500, 511-13,516-17 (giving an overview of the present state of the debate, particularly with regard to sovereignty and EU/EC membership); see also BERNIERsupra note 11, 17-33;
B6HMER,Supra note 1, at 25-35, 187-94; PETERS,supra note 12, at 125-48.

64. See Bilck, supra note 3, at 2, 34-38, 55; see also ERNST B. HAAS,
(1964).
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B. Approaches to World Federalism Models
In early writings on federalism on the international level a clear statecentered view prevailed. Thus, Joseph Kunz observed in 1952 that the realization of the federal ideal, "if made on a universal scale, must lead to a world state,
and, if made on a regional level, to a federal state."6 But by 1966, a considerably
different view was voiced by Edward McWhinney, who asked:
What lessons have the theory and practice of "classical" federalism to offer for what is perhaps the most striking aspect of international law and relations of the present era of change - [i.e.] the
movement (whether on a substantially regional basis or whether
more generally transcending geographical, even hemispheric limits) for political, military, economic integration and association
along some sort of supranational lines?'
In this era of globalization, however, most models for structuring the present
pluralism of entities exercising public authority are primarily concerned with
strengthening the legitimacy of the transnational exercise of public authority
through democracy or its equivalents. This approach, in turn, has led some authors to deal with federalism only incidentally, rather than explicitly as a conceptual issue in and of itself. Yet, since democracy is widely held to be intrinsically
linked to the state, the models for a democratically constituted transnational order
tend to be conceived in terms of a "World State" or "World Republic," preferably
constituted as a "Federal World Republic."67 A prominent example is the model
developed by the well-known German political philosopher Otfried Hbffe.
Strongly influenced by Kant, he advances a model which he calls a "subsidiary
Federal World Republic." The constituent entities of this federal structure are, in

65. Joseph L. Kunz, Supra-NationalOrgans, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 690, 695 (1952).

66.

EDWARD MCWHINNEY, FEDERAL CONSTITUTION-MAKING FOR A MULTI-NATIONAL WORLD

112

(1966).
67. See generally BERNIER, SUpra note 11, at 202-20 (giving a concise account of earlier proposals
or projects for federalism as a model for international integration); WELTSTAAT ODER STAATENWELT: FOR UND WIDER DIE IDEE EINER WELTREPUBLIK [WORLD STATE OR A WORLD OF STATES: THE

Matthias Lutz-Bachmann
eds., 2002) (setting forth a collection of papers discussing the pros and cons of a World Republic or
World State).
PROS AND CONS OF THE IDEA OF A WORLD REPUBLIC] (James Bohman &
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this order, states, intermediate regional organizations such as the EU, and universal international organizations such as the United Nations. 61 Interestingly, private
nonstate actors are not listed. NGOs are solely seen as a part of civil society, in
which they are accorded a prominent role in fostering democratic participation of
the people and in the development of a "World."69 The individual persons are envisaged gradually to acquire a dual citizenship, as citizens of their home nations
and as world citizens. The federally bonded entities are to be governed by public
international and supranational law, civil society by a private world law (the
Kantian Weltbiirgerrecht).7 Basic legal, one should say, constitutional principles
underpinning the public law are the rule of law, social justice, and democracy. The
purpose of the "Federal World Republic" is to deal only with those global problems with which states or other lower level entities cannot adequately cope. It is to
supplement state and regional public authorities as a subsidiary means of imple7
menting public tasks. 1
From these necessarily sketchy observations, it becomes quite evident that
federalist approaches to defining the present international system or the political
goals to be achieved are primarily state-centered. Applied to the regionally limited
integration process-particularly of the 1950s and early 1960s-the statecentered perspective may have had some basis in the political reality of Western
Europe. Applied to the international system, including the European scenery in
this era ofglobalization, the state-centered approach appears not to be in line with
the actual transformations of the role of states, the growing role of nonstate actors,
and the resultant transformations of international law. If the federalism paradigm

68. Otfried H6ffe, Globalitdt statt Globalismus-Uber eine subsididre undfdderale Weltrepublik
[GlobalAproach Instead of Globalism-Reflections on a Subsidiary and Federal World Republic], in
WELTSTAAT ODER STAATENWELT-FuR UND WIDER DIE IDEE EINER WELTREPUBLIK [WORLD STATE OR
A WORLD OF STATES - THE PRO AND CON OF THE IDEA OF A WORLD REPUBLIC],

supra note 67,

at

8-31

[hereinafter H6ffe, Globalitat];see also OTFRIED H6FFE, DEMOKRATIE IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG [DEMOCRACY IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATIoN]passim (1999) (discussing this issue within a

broader philosophical framework).
69. H6ffe, Globalitdt, supra note 68, at 10.
70. Id. at 31.
71. Id. at 25-26. Other authors-not explicitly conceiving transnational governances in federalism terms-also emphasize that in the emerging complex system of public authorities, states will
continue to play an important role in the implementation of those public tasks that can best be dealt
with on the state level-some kind of a subsidiarity principle seems to be present in these writings,
as well. See, e.g., KEOHANE,supra note 55, at 248-49; Held, supra note 57, at 422-25.
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is to have relevance for the aim of structuring the present pluralism of actors exercising public authority on different levels and in different sectors, it needs to be
re-conceptualized from a perspective that is not state-centered, without losing
those valuable elements of a republican federalism that are not inherently state-related: unity in diversity, functional division of powers (vertical and horizontal),
and a common constitutional framework based on the rule of law, human rights,
and social justice.
C. TransnationalFederalism
From a realist or neo-realist point of view, in a world of sovereign states there
is no room for any form of federalism beyond the state. However, as we have seen
in the foregoing examination of the international system, the facts no longer support such an assessment of the status of states. Rather we are confronted with a
multilayered, but at the same time horizontally structured, system of governance.72 True, this system does not fulfill the criteria of either a federal state or a
traditional confederation of sovereign states. But conceiving the present system,
under the conditions of globalization, as an emerging transnational federal order,
may provide us with the necessary means to cope with at least some of the problems that are the primary concern of globalization critics: the seemingly isolated
exercise of public authority on different levels, the ensuing inability to curb an unfettered neo-capitalism, and the legitimacy deficit, whether in terms of democracy
or a lack of accountability and transparency.7 3 A concept of transnational federalism that is not state-centered could serve as a structural-functional framework
and in legal terms as a constitutional basis for the vertical and horizontal cooperation of the various actors exercising public authority beyond the states for the
common good. Going into more detail, I shall take up relevant elements of federalism in turn.
1. TransnationalFederalismas a Means to Promote Unity in Diversity
As the starting point, I take up the notion of a multilayered system of governance, mentioned above, as it suggests an element of federalism in the present

72. See discussion infra Part I.
73. See Jost DelbrOck, ExercisingPublicAuthority Beyond the State: TransnationalDemocracy and!
or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29 (2003) (discussing the
problem of providing legitimacy to the exercise of public authority beyond the state).
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international system. The notion of "multilayered governance" appears to indicate that public authority is exercised on different levels that are put on top of
each other like layers of a cake. But actually that is not quite true. As previously
shown, these layers of public authorities are not only layers put on top of each
other but they are also vertically interconnected. In the area of law making, international organizations significantly impact regional actors and domestic legal
orders to an even greater degree.74 On the other hand, actors from the lower
levels participate in the law-making process within international and supranational organizations. We have also seen that international, regional and domestic administrations are vertically integrated in their day-to-day transactions.
This interconnectedness is more intense in the case of supranational organizations than it is in the case of international organizations. The increased interconnectedness of states and supranational organizations is clearly illustrated by the
fact that the constitutions of supranational organizations and their member
states mutually supplement each other-the constitution of one is part of the
constitution of the other.75 This vertical interconnectedness of the different entities exercising public authority structurally binds them together. Horizontally,
the public authorities are to a large extent bound together by mutual obligations
to cooperate-like the international organizations of the U.N. family.7 6 Likewise, NGOs are also integrated into the transnational exercise of public authority through their consultative, monitoring, and implementing functions within
the framework of international and regional organizations. However, neither
the vertical nor the horizontal bonds existing between the various actors restrict

74. See discussion infra pp. 36-41.
75. See PETERS, supra note 12, at 207-15; see also B6HMER, Upra note 1, at 148-57.
76. The obligations of states to cooperate with international organizations are set forth in the latter's constitutions, as in articles 1(3), 2(2), 25, 55, and 56 of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Karl Doehring,
Self-Determination,in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY, supra note 17, at
47, para.3 1. In some cases, obligations to cooperate also exist among international organizations as,
for instance, among the Specialized Organizations of the U.N. family with the United Nations Organization and between international governmental organizations and NGOs. See, e.g., U.N.
CHARTER art. 57-58, 71. Similar obligations are provided in the constitutions of other international
organizations. See 2 DAHM ET AL., supra note 1, at 238; see generally INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COOPERATION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY-PROCEEDINGS
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their identities. Thus, structural unity in diversity, adapted to the conditions of
the transnational realm, is being established-as is typical for a federal system.
2. Division of Powers
It can hardly be contested that there exists a division of powers, vertically
and horizontally, within the federalizing international system. In contrast to
federal states or confederations, there is no comprehensive legal act regulating
the distribution or allocation of functions and powers. Only within regional supranational organizations is the distribution of powers between the supranational and the domestic level constitutionally regulated by the principle of
enumerated powers.77 Only those functions expressly or implicitly conferred to
the supranational organization may be exercised by it. The vertical distribution
of powers, in the international system in general, appears to be guided by the
principle of subsidiarity, that is, powers are allocated to the level of public authority where the respective tasks can be dealt with most effectively. Thus, the
maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of
the United Nations and, under certain circumstances, regional collective security systems. Individual states retain the power to use military force only as an
exception to the general prohibition of the use of force (i.e. in cases of selfdefense). The enforcement of human rights, normally the obligation of states,
has been elevated to a common concern of humankind. Accordingly, judicial
enforcement and conciliatory compliance mechanisms have been established on
the transnational level. 7' Recently, the public or common interest in human
rights protection beyond states has been strongly emphasized by the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which under certain conditions is empowered to sanction severe human rights violations committed by

77. According to the "principle of enumerated powers," the European Parliament, the Council,
the Commission, and the Court of Justice exercise their functions only in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties conferring the respective powers upon them. See Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 5;see also European Community Treaty, supra note 34, at art. 5(1).
78. On the international level, the International Court of Justice (one of the six main organs of
the United Nations), the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, and the Permanent Court
of Arbitration may be mentioned as prime examples of this trend, but one has to remember that
beyond these courts, international law provides for various other fora and mechanisms for the
peaceful settlement of disputes. See, e.g., Anne Peters, Cooperation in InternationalDispute Settlement, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COOPERATION, supra note 76, at 107-62.
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individuals.79 Looking at the present distribution of powers among the various
public authorities, one has to realize that while such distribution exists, it is not
yet the result of a coherent strategy. That is not to say, though, that such a strategy isa prioriinfeasible, as the examples of a deliberate transfer of public authority to specific transnational entities show.
It may be added at this point that, as within states, the division and distribution of powers on the transnational level also serves as an instrument of mutual
control of the different actors. It is in this context that NGOs integrated in the
exercise of public authority can play an important role as entities that promote
the transparency of the transnational decision-making processes and thereby
strengthen the accountability of the different public authorities. This is no substitute for democratic legitimation, but is a realistic surrogate."°
3. TransnationalFederalism as a ConstitutionalFramework
According to the traditional view, there is no room for constitutions on the
transnational level, since only states may have constitutions. International
practice proves, however, that such a state-centered concept of the constitution is
no longer valid. International and supranational organizations are clearly based
on constitutions containing not only organizational provisions but also valuebased norms.8' Of course, at present we are far from being able to set up a comprehensive constitution for the emerging transnational federal system. However, there is a growing consensus in international legal doctrine and in parts of
the international community that international law-not to speak of the special
case of the law of supranational organizations-is undergoing a process of

79. See supra text accompanying note 31.
80. See, e.g., SONJA RIEDINGE, DIE ROLLE
ENTWICKLUNG
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246-78 (2001) (discussing the role of NGOs in the area of securing compliance with international environmental law).
81. The provisions of the U.N. Charter on the maintenance of international peace and security,
the protection of human rights, and the promotion of economic and social welfare are clear
examples of value-based norms in the constitutive instrument of an international organization.
Similar kinds of norms can be found in the constitutions of the other U.N. family organizations
such as the ILO, UNESCO, FAO, WHO, and WTO. International and surpanational organizations, such as the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, and the Organization
of African Unity, show a great number of value based norms on the regional level as well.
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constitutionalization1 2 The now firmly established concept of jus cogens, (i.e.
recognition of fundamental norms that are essential to the general welfare and
cannot be abrogated except by norms of equal rank) and the increasingly accepted notion of law-making treaties with erga omnes effect whose observance is
owed to the international community as a whole, are a clear indication of this
constitutionalizing process.83 The acceptance of such fundamental norms with
erga omnes effect opens the avenue for developing a legal framework that could
serve as a value-oriented constitutional order for a transnational federal system.
As we have also seen in the foregoing analysis, international law is presently
opening up to private entities as partial derivative subjects of itself. This would
mean that the constitutional order of the transnational federal system would also
extend to private nonstate actors participating in the exercise of public authority
beyond the state, thus strengthening the rule of law on the transnational level.
In summary, the foregoing analysis suggests that the present international
system has several elements of federalism in common with state-centered federal systems. The decisive difference between the two is, that transnational federalism is a process, not a predetermined, fixed, and territorialized form of a
political community. Transnational federalism is an open-ended structural and
functional way of governance commensurate to the challenges posed by the
equally dynamic process of globalization.

82. See Jochen A. Frowein, Konstitutionalisierungdes Vdlkerrechts [Constitutionlizationof InterBERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FOR VOLKERRECHT 427-45 (2000); see
also DAHM ET AL., supra note 1, at 780-781; see also StructuralChanges, supra note 1, at 34-35.
83. See 3 DAHM ET AL., supra note 1, at 619-32; see also Christian Tomuschat, ObligationsArising
for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COORS [R.D.C.] 209-369 (1993); see also B.
Simma, From Bilateralismto Community Interest in InternationalLaw, 250 R.D.C. 229-376 (1994).
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